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“White-heating the Real” – On Music’s Force 
Towards Impossible Nudeness
In what follows I would like to develop some thoughts about music and – maybe – 
a force towards a utopian and impossible state of nudeness that the experience 
of music can bring about, as I would like to argue. For this argument I will re-
construct something Alain Didier Weill first brought up in 1976 in the form of an 
intervention at Jacques Lacan’s seminar.1 This intervention is a particular – even 
singular – one in all of Lacan’s seminars, as it is about music. While Lacan – and 
Freud – famously commented many times on literature or the visual arts – music 
almost never functions as a field of reference in Lacan’s speaking and writing. 
And that is also true for the other way around: In the aesthetics of music psycho-
analysis has not played a major role – at least not to the extent that it has done so 
in the aesthetics of the visual arts, the aesthetics of cinema, or literature studies.2 
The lack of references to music in Lacan is, as François Regnault has pointed 
out, not due to the fact that Lacan was not interested in music. On the contrary: 
According to Regnault, Lacan was an eager follower of contemporary music, 
which at the time in Paris was very much a lively scene. Regnault offers another 
explanation for the lack of musical reference in Lacan: Whatever Lacan does 
1 He has later published a script for his intervention: Alain Didier Weill, “Quand la mu-
sique nous entend. Contribution à la question de la pulsion invoquante.”, accessed 23 
May 2017, https://www.alaindidierweill.com/app/download/5782699042/Quand+la+mu-
sique+nous+entend_1.pdf. As far as I am aware, there is no English translation of Didier 
Weill’s text. Every quotation is therefore my own translation from the original French text. 
There is also another version of Didier Weill’s intervention available at staferla: Alain Di-
dier Weill, “Intervention”, in: L’Insu que sait de l’une bévue s’aile à mourre, 21–25, accessed 
31 July 2017, http://staferla.free.fr/S24/S24%20L’INSU....pdf. I will use this version when 
indicated, again in my own translation. 
2 For the purposes of this article, I will not give a definition of what I take to be music in the 
first place. As these thoughts are still tentative and preliminary, I would for the moment 
rather have it the other way around and try to think different forms of organised sounds 
via the notion of music that I would like to outline here. Certainly, for a more detailed ar-
gument both a more precise definition of music and the implications of its positioning in 
the symbolic order would be necessary.  
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with art, it never functions as a philosophical comment; he is not interested in 
the field of aesthetics as such. If art is mentioned, it is always used to make it 
somehow productive for Lacan’s sole purpose: a return to Freud in psychoanal-
ysis. So maybe the point is – Regnault claims – that music is in no way useful for 
psychoanalysis.3
And at first glance that seems rather convincing: Psychoanalysis, the talking 
cure, depends on signifiers that can be metaphorised and metonymised. It works 
with double meanings, sliding meanings, ambi- and polyvalences. In short: if 
the unconscious is structured like a language, music might just not be some-
thing useful in order to advance psychoanalytical theory. While the concept of 
the gaze as object cause of desire is partially developed by analysing or at least 
referencing actual paintings, the voice as partial object and the singing voice 
may be something completely different: Jacques-Alain Miller once said that the 
voice as objet a in no way belongs to the register of sound.4
On the other hand, “psychoanalysing” music also has its difficulties: either it is 
done mostly by focusing on the lyrics (in the case of music with words) or the 
drama (in the case of opera) or it plays around with associations that are them-
selves uttered and then treated as signifiers. Or – and that option is certainly 
the opposite of psychoanalysis – it makes sense of music or detects a deeper 
meaning of music, be it in respect to the composer or the lyrical Ego of the poem 
that was set to music. None of these strategies are able to point out in which way 
music differs from language. All of them treat music as if it were a language. 
Insofar as music is something that differs from language, music and psychoa-
nalysis might just be of no use to each other. 
There have been many attempts to read music as language. In fact, one might 
even say that conventional (and by conventional I mean conventional in the 
second half of the 20th century) analysis of music is always structural. It is about 
rhythms, harmonies, single tones, relations, repetitions, structures. And of 
course there have been refinements and criticisms of such an analysis, which 
still refer to themselves as a “semiology of music”. Jean-Jacques Nattiez in his 
3 See François Regnault, Lacan’sche Ästhetik: Vier Vorlesungen, trans. Christoph Sökler, Tu-
ria + Kant, Vienna, Berlin 2016, p. 36. Again my translation. 
4 See Jacques-Alain Miller, “Jacques Lacan et la voix”, Quarto, No. 54 (June 1994).
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“Discourse and Music” widens the scope of his semiology by including not only 
the structural analysis of the work, but also its history and perception.5 
It does not come as a surprise that in recent years neuroscience has also offered 
theories as to the relationship between language and music and as usual falls 
back on paradigms that seemed to be out-dated long ago. I do not want to dive 
into this more deeply, but I would like to argue one point: There is no doubt 
that music speaks to us, that music can be thought in relations of signifier and 
signified, that a structuralist or a semiotic or even a linguistic approach to music 
is possible. Music can be thought of and it can be researched as a language. But 
I do think that this approach to music misses what is most musical in music. 
Music is not reducible to any symbolic order. And it is certainly not – and I quote 
here from an interview with the neuroscientist Francis A. Sooy – another means 
of communication, which communicates “some message of significance using 
sound” and it does not simply involve “the sharing of ideas and experience.”6
I agree with Nattiez that the relation between music and language (and again: 
a great deal of musicology depends on just that relation) has to be thought by 
including the listening subject. But I think the analysis has to be taken a step 
further: I want to suggest that music is situated at the rim of language, at the 
border between language and non-language. Music is neither just another lan-
guage with its own rules, conditions, and possibilities, nor is it a universal lan-
guage, as the above-quoted neuroscientist would have it. But neither is it the 
opposite of language as that which can communicate what is not communicable 
in words, or as that which could facilitate an experience of the sublime. 
Music – to quote and refute one last position regarding the relationship between 
music and language – is certainly not the paradisiacal precursor of language. In 
a speech Peter Sloterdijk delivered at the opening of the Luzern Festival in 2005, 
he claimed that music is a regression towards our being inside the body of the 
mother, her heartbeat and the sound of her voice being the referent for what we 
5 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990.
6 “Music as the Brain’s Universal Language”, accessed 19 May 2017, http://www.dana.org/
Briefing_Papers/Music_as_the_Brain_s_Universal_Language/.
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basically hear when we listen to music.7 I do not want to go more deeply into an 
analysis of Sloterdijk’s claim here, but from what I will say it will become clear 
that what I think is quite the opposite of that position. 
I want to present an account of listening to music that could be (and has been 
by Alain Didier Weill) called experimenting with lack. One way of saying this is 
to put it topologically: Music is always on the other side. If you think of it as lan-
guage, it will make your thinking collapse; if you think of it as the other of lan-
guage, it will do the same. And only as this neither/nor could music – I think – 
facilitate another kind of thinking or another relationship to the Other.
That is my claim and, as I said, I want to call on Alain Didier Weill as a witness – 
via a reconstruction of his intervention at Lacan’s seminar. Didier Weill distin-
guishes certain logical times in the experience of listening to music. They are 
logical times because they cannot be put into any chronological order, they sort 
of happen all at the same time and are only distinguished for the sake of their 
“Darstellbarkeit”, their ability to be represented. They are times because they 
happen as relations or as “torsions between the subject and the Other.”8 To be 
clear: he is talking about the experience of listening to music, about the effects 
that are produced in a listener. It is not about making music, performing music, 
or composing music.
The first logical time of the listener’s experience according to Didier Weill is 
characterised by music responding to a question that inhabits the listener with-
out him knowing it. Or to be more precise: music makes this question appear as 
antecedent. The listener is inhabited by a lack and music makes this lack appear 
by responding to it without filling it. It just “says it directly.”9 So it is as if there 
were a “music-making subject”10 that responds to a lack that inhabits “me” as a 
listener. The response is somehow inspired by that lack which is unconscious – 
I do not know anything about it. The only thing I know is that music responds 
7 Peter Sloterdijk, “La musique retrouvée”, in: Der ästhetische Imperativ: Schriften zur Kunst, 
Peter Weibel, Fundus-Bücher (eds.), Philo & Philo Fine Arts, Hamburg 2007, pp. 10ff.
8 Didier Weill, “Intervention”, p. 21.
9 Didier Weill, “Quand la musique nous entend. Contribution à la question de la pulsion 
invoquante.”, p. 2.
10 Didier Weill, “Intervention”, p. 21.
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to this lack that I have not known before. But the music that responds does not 
know anything about that lack either. It is in no way a question of knowledge.
 
Maybe that lack that inhabits the listening “me”, Didier Weill goes on, is the 
lack of the music itself. It was maybe music’s own lack that made the lack in the 
listening subject appear in the first place.
With the meeting of these two lacks Didier Weill comes dangerously close to the 
notion of fusion: Via music it would be possible to fuse with the Other. It would 
enable the listener to get rid of that alienating lack, which finally would dissolve 
in an oceanic feeling. If it were like that the non-chronological series of torsions 
would either end here or repeat itself on and on. No matter how impossible it 
would be to remain fused with the other, music would be an occasion of expe-
riencing this never-to-be-realised state of completeness. In short: music would 
be a narcissistic experience. Is not the child in front of a mirror in Lacan’s text 
about the mirror stage experiencing such an imaginary fusion?11 Music as imag-
inary completeness would function as nothing more than a mirror, a pacifying 
response to the split subject.
Or – and this would be just the reverse side of the same thing: Music as a feel-
ing of fusion would function as the dissolution of the subject, as a Dionysian 
feeling of the subject, which would be falling apart into affects, intensities, and 
becoming. The fusion of lacks could either fantasmatically stabilise the sub-
ject or dismantle him. And it could do both at the same time. Stopping here 
would bring about identity and dissolutive repetition. We could here recall the 
famous passage in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “A Thousand Plateaus”: “Music is 
never tragic, music is joy. […] Music has a thirst for destruction, every kind of 
destruction, extinction, breakage, dislocation.”12 This thirst for destruction that 
is attributed to music brings to mind the strong connection between narcissism 
and aggressiveness so predominant in Lacan, for example in “The Mirror Stage” 
when he speaks about the “evident connection between the narcissistic libido 
11 Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psycho-
analytic Experience”, in: Écrits: The first complete edition in English, Norton, New York; 
London 2006, pp. 75–81.
12 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1996, p. 299. 
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and the alienating function of the I, the aggressivity it releases in any relation 
to the other.”13
But for Didier Weill the two lacks do not fuse with each other, not as a narcis-
sistic experience and not as a Dionysian feeling – they remain separated, as the 
lacks are not “identical” but “similar”14. This leads to a second relation (again, 
not in a chronological way) – quite the opposite of the first one: The listening 
subject now responds to the lack in the musical Other. The subject uses the very 
notes that responded to him, which “were chanted for him”, to “enchant” the 
other.15 At this point Didier Weill recalls the strange motion that while listening 
to music it is as if the music were produced by the listening subject himself: 
“The subject can cease to be the one who is apprehended by the desire of music 
to become the one who desires to make himself heard.”16 This is the first torsion 
in the relation between the subject and the Other.
It is at this point that Didier Weill – being the Lacanian that he is – points to an 
analogy in structure. If listening to music were based on this first torsion and if it 
circled around these two separated, non-identical but similar lacks, the relation 
between music and the listening subject would simply have the same structure 
as love. Is not Lacan’s myth of love in the seminar on transference exactly this: 
The hand that reaches for the ripe fruit or the flower in full bloom only to dis-
cover that the ripe fruit or the flower becomes a hand that is reaching itself for 
the other hand, which then becomes a fruit or a flower? And Lacan is careful not 
to stop here as this could be misunderstood as some kind of symmetry: “The 
structure in question is not this symmetry and this return. So that this symmetry 
is not really one. Insofar as the hand stretches out, it is towards an object. It is in 
the hand that appears from the other side that the miracle lies.”17  
13 Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience”, p. 79.
14 Didier Weill, “Quand la musique nous entend. Contribution à la question de la pulsion 
invoquante.”, p. 2.
15 Ibid., p. 3.
16 Ibid.
17 Jacques Lacan, “The Seminar of Jacques Lacan VIII”, trans. Cormac Gallagher, 46, accessed 
23/5/2017, www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/THE-SEMINAR-OF-
JACQUES-LACAN-VIII-Draft-21.pdf.
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But Didier Weill does not stop there either. He describes yet another logical time, 
another torsion, another relation between the subject and the Other. He thinks 
of this third logical time as a possibility for the subject to experiment with two 
different lacks – its own lack and the lack of the Other “without the mediation 
of a fantasmatic object.”18 Music – so he claims – opens up the possibility of 
directly enjoying the barred Other, the Other that is fundamentally inconsistent 
and lacking. Let me quote a longer passage here: 
The subject – after having encountered the impossibility of meeting both the 
object that the Other lacks and the object which he himself lacks – [decides to 
jump] into the void by not tackling one or the other lack, but both of them: In this 
moment the subject and the Other would not fuse. On the contrary, their sepa-
rating lacks would be put together. At this point the real as impossible would be 
set alight, it would be white-heated in a shared experience: the subject and the 
Other both as close as possible and as far apart as possible as well. Time, there-
fore, ceases and in this sublimation of time we could advance the hypothesis that 
everything that happens is a sort of commemoration of the founding act of the un-
conscious insofar as it is snatched from the real via a fundamental symbolisation 
that is carried towards the impossible embracing of the two voids.19 
So what can this passage tell us about my initial claim, i.e. that music is situ-
ated at the border of language and non-language? What could non-language 
even mean? In the second part of this paper I would like to make an attempt at 
interpreting this quoted passage. I will do that tentatively and with the help of 
Deleuze – not the Deleuze of the Anti-Oedipus, nor the Deleuze of the Logic of 
Sense, but with the help of Deleuze’s early book on Kant, particularly its intro-
duction, which was added much later. I will also use Deleuze’s development of 
the rather short introduction in his seminar on Kant.20 
Let us focus for a moment on this rather strange deduction in this longer pas-
sage from Didier Weill’s intervention: The real would be set alight, it would be 
white-heated – and “time therefore ceases.” How is it possible to understand 
18 Didier Weill, “Quand la musique nous entend. Contribution à la question de la pulsion 
invoquante,” p. 4.
19 Ibid.
20 Gilles Deleuze, “On Kant”, accessed 23 May 2017, http://deleuzelectures.blogspot.com/ 
2007/02/on-kant.html.
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that, if we do not just take it as an obscure reference to a certain feeling of time-
lessness we sometimes experience when we listen to music? 
It is at this point that I want to call on Deleuze’s notion of time in Kant. Kant, 
says Deleuze, introduces an understanding of time that is completely new. Up 
until Kant time was measured by movement, it was subordinated to movement, 
whereas Kant liberates time from its subjugation to anything: “time is no longer 
coiled up in such a way that it is subordinated to the measure of something 
other than itself, such as, for example astronomical movement. […] time is lib-
erated, stretches itself, ceases to be a cosmological or psychological time, […] to 
become a formal time, a pure deployed form.”21
So now that we have time as a “pure deployed form”, what does this time do to 
the subject? This liberated time, Deleuze goes on, is the “form of auto-affection, 
the form under which I affect myself.”22 For Deleuze, the problem of the tran-
scendental Ego is a problem of time. He starts with Descartes: “I think therefore 
I am. I am a thing that thinks.” And he goes on: 
If it is true that the I think is a determination, it implies in this respect an indeter-
minate existence (I am). But nothing so far tells us under what form this existence 
is determined by the I think: it is determinable only in time, under the form of 
time, thus as the existence of phenomenal, receptive, and changing ego. I cannot 
therefore constitute myself as a unique and active subject, but as a passive ego 
which represents to itself only the activity of its own thought, that is to say, the 
I, as an Other which affects it. I am separated from myself by the form of time.23 
Of course, Deleuze is referring to Kant’s notion of the “inner sense” which is 
time and also the “Inbegriff aller Vorstellungen”. In English: “For the original 
apperception is related to inner sense (the sum of all representations), and 
indeed related a priori to its form, i.e., the relation of the manifold empirical 
consciousness in time.”24 It is crucial to note here that the pure form of time 
is filled with activity and passivity. It is the form of time that determines the 
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1998, A23ff. / B37ff.
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split between “passive ego which represents to itself only the activity of its own 
thought.” Something is at work here, something is moving – determined by the 
form of time.  
So what happens to this movement, the movement of the split subject, when 
“time ceases”? Does the subject fantasmatically cease to be split and acquire 
fullness and completeness at last? Are we referred back to the first logical time 
in experiencing music and its implied and then refuted notion of fusion? Not at 
all, because there is a third aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation of Kant’s concep-
tion of time that is important here.
Deleuze speaks about one chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason, the “The Antic-
ipations of Perception”. This chapter is about “Empfindungen”, i.e. sensations, 
and the conditions of their possibility.25 For Kant, time and space are extensive 
magnitudes, which means that everything that is perceived in space and time is 
perceived as a multiplicity and as a unity at the same time. “An extensive mag-
nitude is one whose parts are apprehended successively so that […] extensible 
or extensive magnitude will be defined in the following way: The multiplicity 
refers to a gathering of parts into a whole.”26
But space and time are not only filled with extensive magnitudes; they are 
also filled with intensive magnitudes, such as temperature, for example, and 
Deleuze points out two characteristics of intensive magnitudes: They are per-
ceived instantly (and not successively) and the multiplicity perceived in them 
no longer refers to a succession but to a degree, which is to say, it “refers to a 
variable proximity to degree zero.”27 So every intensive quantity implies a “de-
gree zero”. Every perception in space and time is also one of intensive quantity 
and is thus related to “degree zero”. And therefore the question is not “if there 
is an empty space or an empty time,” but “if there is an empty consciousness of 
space and time.”28
25 Ibid., A166 / B207-A176 / B218. 
26 Deleuze, “On Kant”.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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Now I would like to suggest that the “ceasing of time” Didier Weill talks about 
has something to do with this “degree zero” implied by the perception of inten-
sive quantities. If the split subject in his activity and passivity is determined by 
the form of time, “degree zero” could mean just that: pure form of time without 
the mediation of the activity and passivity of the split subject. It is tempting here 
to analogise “passivity of the subject” (the subject is sought by the desire of the 
Other), “activity of the subject” (the subject now seeks the Other by way of its 
own desire), and “pure form of time” (time ceases) to the three logical times in 
musical experience. 
Let us take this back to a more Lacanian perspective: There can be no doubt 
that for Lacan, following Freud, activity and passivity are parts of what Freud 
calls the “vicissitudes of the drive”, “Triebschicksale”. The first torsion in Didier 
Weill’s account is nothing more than a “Verkehrung ins Gegenteil”, a reversion 
of the drive. But let us not forget: The very fact that there are subjects and drives 
is due to the subject being a “parlêtre”, a being that speaks. If we follow Didier 
Weill and discern a third torsion in the relation between subject and Other in 
the musical experience, in which the subject can experiment with both lacks, 
his own so-to-speak, and the lack in the Other “without the mediation of a fan-
tasmatic object,” what would that “degree zero”, this sublimation of activity and 
passivity, mean for the speaking subject? The subject, in this third logical time, 
is led to a state in which he can almost no longer be called a subject, as this “de-
gree zero”, the ceasing of the activity and passivity of the subject managing his 
split, is like a pre-subjective state of the subject in which intensity is brought to 
its full potential, which means to degree zero, as the reference of every intensi-
ty. So it is the opposite of fullness, it is emptiness. As for Lacan a subject is not 
thinkable without language (let us just recall his definition of the subject as that 
which is represented by a signifier for another signifier), the ceasing of the sub-
ject’s time, its reduction to degree zero brings it to this border I discussed earlier: 
the border between language and non-language. 
To be clear: it is certainly impossible to cross that border. The subject has always 
been and will always have been a “parlêtre”, but he can get close to this border 
between language and non-language via the experience of music. Let us also not 
forget that the third logical time is not to be severed from the first two times. It 
is neither their result, nor their aim or their goal. They all happen at once and 
bring the listening subject to that border without ever letting him cross it.
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To end my paper I would like to make another connection between this bor-
der position – I am, by the way, not sure if the border between language and 
non-language is the only way of thinking that borderline position of music – 
and possible consequences on ways towards another thinking. 
In her paper “Dying of Shame, Consumed by Anxiety: Moods and the Body”,29 
Ruth Ronen calls shame a “primordial affect” (along with anxiety), which is to 
say that the relationship to the Other is different than with any other affect: “The 
primordial affect relates to the Other’s presence without falling back on the pro-
tection of the Other as a source of meaning and value.” The Other as symbolic 
is not only that which inaugurates a lack, an alienation and a separation. It is 
also something that protects – although never enough and always too strongly. 
Being affected by shame and anxiety means losing this protection. When Didier 
Weill calls the third logical time of listening to music “a sort of commemoration 
of the founding act of the unconscious insofar as it is snatched from the real via 
a fundamental symbolization,” he speaks about this borderline between being 
protected and being helpless. I think it is possible to experiment – in a playful 
way – at this borderline by experiencing music.
Let me – on a less theoretical note – illustrate this with a work of art: In 2015 the 
artist duo Anna Romanenko and Björn Kühn presented a work called “Blush”30. 
They asked their fellow students to sing a short part of a Schubert song while be-
ing videotaped. After that, they made them watch the video and took pictures of 
them watching it. The artists drew on some study that had tried to find a way to 
make people blush. The best way the scientists could find was to gather a group 
of friends and make them do exactly what Anna Romanenko and Björn Kühn did 
with their fellow students. While the scientists found out that this works best 
with a group of friends, the artists tried the experiment the other way around: 
Would this collective blushing create friendship?
I am not interested in the empirical outcome of this experiment, but in the sub-
jective structure it deals with and in the hypothesis it formulates. First of all, 
the blushing – and for the moment I would like to take blushing as an index of 
29 Ruth Ronen, “Dying of Shame, Consumed by Anxiety”, Hurly-Burly 4 (2011).
30 I did have the honour of helping the artists with that work by teaching singing to the stu-
dents. That is why I can give a first hand account of the process of the work. 
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shame – did not occur when people sang, but only when they listened to them-
selves singing. Obviously, there are many things at work here: There is an inter-
subjective dimension as well as an intrasubjective dimension. But I would like 
to focus on this one thing: Singing as perhaps the most imminent way of mak-
ing music (and making music in this case, as in Didier Weill’s account, means 
re-making it by listening to it – in this case helped by the fact that it was in fact 
the students themselves who had produced the music in the first place) might be 
able to produce a helplessness that is experienced as playful (the blushing while 
listening was not accompanied by crying or shock, but by laughter and jokes) 
and that might recreate intersubjective relations.
Obviously, one does not feel bare shame and anxiety when listening to music – 
if not in a playful way. Music rather seems to function as a last resort against that 
abyss of shame and anxiety that enables us to experiment or to play right at the 
border. It could well be called a becoming-music of another type than Deleuze 
and Guattari might have imagined. Not as positive disintegration and unavoida-
ble reintegration, but as a playfulness in the face of the abyss.   
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